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Abstract 
 
The essay applies the methodology put forward in Baur (2003) with some modifications and 
extensions in order to investigate on contagion and spillover effects originating from the 
financial sector in European and U.S. equity markets during the crisis following the “dot-
com” bubble in 2000-2003 and the financial crisis of 2007-2009. A clear distinction between 
spillover and contagion effects is drawn and the first as well as the second moment is 
investigated. An EGARCH approach including a parameter to capture the leverage effect is 
applied to model the conditional variance. 
Mean contagion is found to be negative in the U.S. and mostly positive in Europe during the 
financial crisis which does not provide convincing evidence for the contagion hypothesis, 
rather the opposite. The more central role the financial sector plays during the financial crisis 
is clearly reflected in terms of positive volatility contagion in most non-financial sectors. We 
can conclude that the turbulences in the financial sector encroached partly upon non-financial 
sectors expressed through positive volatility contagion. Volatility contagion is consistently 
significant and positive in both the U.S. and Europe for the technology, industrials, and health 
care sector. However, the approach taken appears not suitable to clearly distinguish between 
supply-side and demand-side effects.  
Keywords: Spillover; Contagion; EGARCH; financial crisis; financial sector; equity markets. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
Financial institutions are heavily under pressure from both a moral and financial point of 
view. The current crisis takes a huge toll on banks around the globe and many of the biggest 
global institutions struggle for survival and some would arguably be out of business without 
government assistance. It is quite common that banks suffer from losses during recessions as 
their clients' ability to fulfill obligations decreases. An additional aspect of the current crisis is 
that many blame the financial sector for having triggered the crisis with their reckless lending 
and lenient risk management. Much attention has recently been paid to financial institutions 
and their role in the current recession. Not only popular sentiment identifies them as the ones 
being at least partly responsible for the sharp downturn, also scholarly research has aimed at 
investigating on their conduct or possible misconduct. Honohan (2008, p. 1) blames the 
“overconfidence on the part of bankers and regulators in mechanical risk management 
models” for the failure of banks. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, 
acknowledges that a lack of appropriate supervision contributed to the extensive risk exposure 
of banks (Bernanke, 2008). The concept of systemic risk in context with financial institutions 
is fairly well developed. It describes the constant underlying threat of a collective bank 
collapse and derives the need for special treatment of the financial sector, banks in particular.1 
The mentioned developments would already justify a closer look at the impact of the financial 
sector on the rest of the economy, but a more comprehensive motivation for the contagion 
hypothesis will be put forward. 
The following section is mainly based on the ideas of Hyman Minsky. Minsky is classified as 
a post-Keynesian economist that implies his ideas are based on the Keynesian view that the 
economy is not tending toward equilibrium endogenously (Whalen, 2008, p. 95f.). He applies 
those ideas specifically to financial markets and focuses on financial institutions and credit. 
The theory labeled as “financial instability theory” in Minsky (1992) regards financial 
institutions as profit-seeking units and not as simple mediators of the credit and savings 
process. As a result banks find ways to increase their earning potentials similar to any other 
economic actor in a capitalist economy. Such innovation leads to a deterioration of credit 
quality, in particular during prosperous times. It can be distinguished between three types of 
income-debt relations: hedge finance, speculative finance, and Ponzi finance. Hedge finance 
implies that all obligations, that is to say principal and interest, can be fulfilled with current 
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 See Kaufman and Scott (2005) for a recent reiteration of the subject. 
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cash flows. Creditors categorized as speculatively financed are able to pay interest with their 
generated cash flows, not the principal which has to be re-financed. Ponzi financed units are 
neither able to service their interest payments nor can they pay the principal out of their 
current cash flow. They finance payments either through additional credit or equity sales. 
As financial institutions are profit seeking they find increasingly innovative ways to move the 
economy towards a higher ratio of speculative and Ponzi finance. Particularly in times of 
flourishing economic growth, credit policies of banks become increasingly lenient and 
promote such development. Minsky (1992, p. 9) proposes that a monetary contraction policy 
of the central bank to fight inflation causes a sudden shift and makes the liquidation of assets 
necessary. If a high proportion of the economy is financed by speculative and Ponzi credit 
many actors have to liquidate assets at the same time and cause a collapse of asset prices. The 
idea that the collapse of the system is caused by monetary policy contradicts the proposition 
that the crisis is created endogenously. It is, however, not difficult to imagine alternative 
triggering scenarios such as a sudden sentiment shift at equity markets or a default of a big, 
Ponzi financed unit. In a rather popular scientific work of Cooper (2008) those ideas are 
applied more specifically to the current crisis. Asymmetric monetary policy reacting only to 
negative shocks with an easing of monetary policy and not constraining in non-crisis periods 
is singled out to be the main driver of the crisis. 
If the theory holds, it puts financial institutions in the center of interest. It explains how 
economic contractions could be caused by developments within the financial sector, 
somewhat independent of government interventions and the state of the non-financial sector. 
It is, of course, dangerous to use the word independent in that context. Government 
intervention, in particular monetary policy, can both prevent and support such developments 
while the rest of the economy profits from increasing asset prices and availability of credit. A 
possible scenario taking those considerations into account, is that the downturn originated in 
the financial sector and encroached upon other sectors. However, this does not necessarily 
have to be the case even if the theory holds. It is very well imaginable that a liquidity crisis 
could force non-financial firms to liquidate assets and drive them out of business first. This 
would mean banks would have securitized their loans sufficiently and this does not seem to 
reflect realities in the current crisis. It will require therefore a quite complex framework to 
empirically test the financial instability hypothesis as a whole and this is not the goal of this 
essay. This paper confines itself to investigating on potential contagion and spillover effects 
originating from the financial sector. 
 3 
The main hypothesis of this essay proposes that the financial sector is in the epicenter of the 
market downturn in the period between mid 2007 and early 2009 and consequently infected 
other sectors in terms of mean and volatility contagion. In addition, it is of interest whether 
contagion effects differ across sectors. Theoretically, two main factors could explain 
differences in spillover and contagion effects from the financial sector (see e.g. Tong and 
Wei, 2008). On the one hand, non-financial firms may suffer from reduced demand caused by 
decreased consumer confidence and less availability of credit for consumption needs. Sectors 
that are particularly vulnerable if those effects are present are consumer goods and consumer 
services. On the other hand, firms may face increasing difficulties to gain access to funding. 
Such a supply-side effect would in particular affect highly leveraged companies with 
continuing finance needs. It requires a thorough analysis of debt and equity structures of the 
respective sectors and no previous research exactly matching the sectoral division chosen in 
this essay could be retrieved.2 This essay will not investigate on the micro-level of firms and 
will focus on the development in the different sector equity markets rather than draw 
conclusions from balance sheets.  
To put the hypothesis to a test the paper analyzes two different stock market crises: The 
market downturn following the so called “dot-com bubble” in 2000-2003 and the current 
financial crisis starting in mid 2007. The prior interest is put on the downturn of 2007-2009 
and the bear market of 2000-2003 is included to compare results. The aim of this paper is to 
test whether there are contagion and spillover effects originating from the financial sector and 
whether they differ across different economic sectors. Important implications for economic 
policy can be derived from such analysis. It gives indications for the necessity of appropriate 
regulation and supervision of the financial sector. Furthermore, in case some non-financial 
sectors are found to be more sensitive to contagion from the financial sector, policy makers 
gain information on where to allocate scarce resources to mitigate effects from a credit crisis. 
Both the first and the second moment of equity returns are investigated and the data cover 
daily observations of two distinct periods from U.S. and European equity sub-indices. 
The principal econometric approach is taken from Baur (2003) with some modifications and 
extensions. Similar research so far has mostly focused on interdependencies in an 
international framework, that is to say investigated on contagion and spillovers between 
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 See e.g. Fan et al. (2004) for an international comparison encompassing leverage ratios and long-term debt 
ratios. They focus, however, on policy factors such as taxation and institutional framework to identify 
potential differences in the finance structure. 
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different countries. It is straightforward to apply similar methodology to a sectoral contagion 
analysis. For both moments shocks originating from the financial sector are incorporated 
directly into our econometric model. We include two different specifications of the 
conditional volatility in the financial sector into a regular EGARCH model of every 
individual non-financial sector in order to test for significant volatility spillover and contagion 
effects. In the first specification the squared returns of the financial sector are used as a 
variance proxy. As an alternative approach we obtain the conditional volatility in the financial 
sector with a separate EGARCH estimation.  
We can show that mean contagion is mostly positive in the “dot-com” bear market of 2000-
2003 for both Europe and the U.S., whereas there is relatively little evidence for volatility 
contagion. The current financial crisis reveals more evidence for volatility contagion in both 
markets. The most striking difference is that mean contagion effects are negative in the U.S. 
market, while they are positive in Europe and more similar to the results of the first period. 
Overall, the hypothesis cannot be accepted unconditionally but for a majority of sectors 
supporting evidence can be found. The financial sector plays a more important role in the 
current financial crisis than in the “dot-com” downturn. We conclude that the turbulences in 
the U.S. financial sector do not encroach fully upon other sectors what is indicated by the 
negative mean contagion effects. The turbulences do, however, at least partly increase 
volatility in other sectors reflecting rising uncertainty. The differences in contagion across 
sectors do not allow clear conclusions whether supply-side or demand-side effects prevail and 
show that our approach is not suitable for such distinction. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as the following: Section 1 gives a short overview of 
relevant literature on contagion and spillover analysis. Section 2 describes the analyzed data 
set and section 3 develops the applied empirical models. Section 4 presents the results of the 
empirical analysis for both the U.S. and Europe. The essay ends with an overview of the main 
findings and conclusions.  
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1. Previous literature on spillover and contagion analysis 
 
A plethora of empirical research has been undertaken to investigate on potential contagion 
and spillover effects of various markets. A comprehensive overview of methodology is given 
by Dungey et al. (2004) and this section refers to some of the literature outlined in their work. 
There are a number of crucial choices involved when performing an analysis of spillover and 
contagion effects. The following chapter provides a selection of prior research relevant for the 
empirical investigations in this essay and clarifies certain terminological issues that are not 
consistent across the literature.  
Regardless of the choice whether to investigate on the first or the second moment of market 
movements, it is crucial to precisely define the terms spillover and contagion. Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002, p. 2223) define contagion as “a significant increase in cross-market linkages 
after a shock”. With this definition it can be distinguished between spillover and contagion 
effects. Interdependences of markets, which can be caused by common factors being present 
in both non-crisis and crisis times, lead to spillover effects. Such spillover effects could be for 
example expressed with simple correlation coefficients. The isolated effect of the crisis, 
possibly originating in one market, leads to contagion that is potentially different from regular 
spillover. An intuitive way to express contagion is as an increase in correlation between 
markets. This notion of spillover and contagion shall serve as the definition also applied in 
this essay.  
Directly using correlation measurements can be problematic and Forbes and Rigobon (2002) 
show that estimates of market cross-correlations are biased in case of heteroskedastic error 
terms.3 Typically, crisis periods are characterized by increasing volatility and in that case 
cross-correlation estimates are upward biased and hence if we test for a significant difference 
between crisis and non-crisis periods we tend to falsely accept this hypothesis. Although it 
could be adjusted for the bias, Baur (2003, p. 410) argues that the correlation coefficient is not 
suitable for measuring contagion effects as it is a symmetric measure whereas contagion 
originates in one market and is thus a non-symmetric phenomenon. Consequently, a modeling 
approach that incorporates the shocks directly is proposed. Dungey and Zhumabekova (2001) 
demonstrate that the correlation coefficient is inappropriate in case the crisis period is small in 
comparison to the non-crisis period. 
                                                 
3
     See appendix 3 for an overview of correlation with the financial sector.  
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It is an essential consideration whether to determine the crisis periods exogenously or 
implement the model in a way that determines them exogenously. In our paper the crisis 
periods are explicitly determined a priori and hence established exogenously.4 Favero and 
Giavazzi (2002) apply a method allowing to determine the crisis by the magnitude of the 
shocks and define a crisis period as a point in time where shocks exceed a certain size that 
depends on the size of the shocks relative to the conditional variance. They initially estimate a 
vector autoregression (VAR) model to obtain residuals and control for interdependences. This 
method is suitable for investigating contagion effects between markets in general, but will 
most certainly not allow obtaining a connected crisis period as not all shocks will be big 
enough during an uninterrupted period. Other researchers investigate on contagion by 
defining a certain threshold return as a crisis indicator and apply a Probit/Logit approach to 
identify contagion effects in terms of overlapping of returns exceeding the threshold return. 
Examples of this approach with some differing features are proposed in Baur and Schulze 
(2005) and Bae et al. (2003). This has again the advantage of determining the crisis periods 
endogenously after establishing a certain criteria, but is not a good fit for the analyzed 
question. Edwards and Susmel (2000) investigate weekly interest rates in three South-
American countries aiming to demonstrate volatility contagion. They apply a regime 
switching SWARCH model that allows determining breakpoints endogenously. They can 
identify periods of contagion lasting between two and seven weeks.  
Investigating volatility contagion in three different financial crises, Jaque (2004) applies a T-
GARCH approach for modeling time varying sovereign bond spreads of individual countries. 
In order to test for contagion effects the estimated conditional variance of the originator is 
included in the equation of the conditional variance of the potentially infected country and 
tested for significance. This approach does not treat the problem of endogeneity, that is to say 
the included estimates of the conditional variance of the originating country are simply 
assumed to be exogenous. This essay will partly adapt this concept and combine it with the 
approach in Baur (2003). 
Taking those findings into account our approach for modeling spillover and contagion effects 
is mainly based on Baur (2003). Similar to Jaque (2004), the model assumes exogeneity of the 
shocks of the potentially contagious sector. Baur (2003, p. 411) postulates this as a rather 
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 Although this might seem like a sub-optimal choice, this essay aims at investigating the periods established a 
priori. This procedure holds the risk that if the investigated effects are present but the crisis periods are 
chosen incorrectly the opportunity to detect those is foregone.  
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weak assumption; however, it must be seen as a weakness of this approach. A main advantage 
of the model is that it allows testing for contagion effects in the first and second moment. In 
addition, it allows for a clear distinction between spillover and contagion effects. The 
empirical models are described in detail in chapter 3. 
The research of Tong and Wei (2008) is the only scientific work that could be found covering 
a topic similar to our analysis. They investigate on non-financial firms and test to which 
extent the credit crunch spills over as a demand-side and supply-side effect. Through 
constructing a financial constraint and demand sensitivity index they attempt to explain stock 
returns. Both variables are found to be significant while the supply-side effect has a stronger 
impact. Contrasting our analysis, shocks are not incorporated directly and there is no sectoral 
division. The methodology is more suitable to distinguish directly between supply-side and 
demand-side effects, in particular if economic sectors are not homogeneous in those variables, 
which seems quite likely in particular for the financial constraint index.  
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2. The Data 
 
The data comprise two different periods of daily sector returns of European and U.S. equity 
markets. The data are retrieved from the Datastream dataset and for Europe the DJ STOXX 
economic sub-index series is used and for the U.S. the FTSE NASDAQ sub-indices are used.5 
The two periods range from 01/01/1998 to 03/11/2003 (hereafter referred to as period one) 
and 01/03/2005 to 03/12/2009 (hereafter referred to as period two). Period one consists of 
1364 observations and period two of 1095 observations. Both periods are divided in a non-
crisis and a crisis period. The determination of the breakpoints is discussed in section 3. 
Returns are obtained taking the logarithmic difference of daily observations. The economic 
sectors represented by the sub-indices are basic materials, consumer goods, consumer 
services, health care, industrials, oil & gas, technology, utilities, telecommunication, and 
financials. The software package E-views is used to obtain empirical estimates. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics, U.S. 
Descriptive statistics, U.S. 
Logarithmic returns 
  
 Basic 
Materials 
 Consumer 
Goods 
Consumer 
Services  
Health 
Care  
 Indus- 
Trials 
Oil & 
Gas  
 Tele- 
com. 
Finan- 
cials  
 Utili- 
ties 
 Tech- 
nology 
Period 1 
          
Non-Crisis 
          
Mean 0,00029 -0,00036 0,00060 0,00003 0,00026 0,00047 0,00032 0,00037 0,00042 0,00156 
Std. Dev. 0,01629 0,01508 0,01343 0,01424 0,01343 0,01410 0,01430 0,01752 0,01044 0,02174 
Crisis 
          
Mean -0,00036 0,00014 -0,00079 -0,00052 -0,00026 -0,00053 -0,00133 -0,00039 -0,00109 -0,00183 
Std. Dev. 0,01597 0,01845 0,01862 0,01761 0,01174 0,01793 0,01860 0,01672 0,01709 0,02984 
Period 2 
          
Non-Crisis 
          
Mean 0,00101 0,00049 0,00038 0,00001 0,00032 0,00024 0,00065 0,00035 0,00066 0,00032 
Std. Dev. 0,01408 0,01036 0,00709 0,00731 0,00599 0,00702 0,00771 0,00698 0,00791 0,00881 
Crisis 
          
Mean -0,00092 -0,00154 -0,00179 -0,00097 -0,00091 -0,00137 -0,00146 -0,00295 -0,00132 -0,00111 
Std. Dev. 0,02995 0,02980 0,02174 0,01552 0,01652 0,02052 0,02327 0,03687 0,02030 0,02240 
 
                                                 
5
 It was not possible to retrieve the corresponding data from the same index series for the desired period. The 
sectoral division of both providers is the same and can be easily compared. The specific datastream codes are 
listed in appendix 1 and appendix 2. 
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Table 1 displays the mean and standard deviation of the crisis and non-crisis periods in the 
U.S. In period one the technology sector outperformes all other sectors in the non-crisis 
period and subsequently declines the most in the crisis period. Average volatility levels are 
higher in the crisis period for all sectors except financials which gives an early indication that 
the hypothesis is unlikely to be confirmed in the first period. In period two average volatility 
levels are higher for all sectors during the crisis. The financial sector declines by far the most 
and average volatility levels are the highest of all sectors.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics, Europe 
Descriptive statistics, Europe 
Logarithmic returns 
  
 Basic 
Materials 
 Consumer 
Goods 
Consumer 
Services  
Health 
Care  
 Indus- 
trials 
Oil & 
Gas  
 Tele- 
com. 
Finan- 
cials  
 Utili- 
ties 
 Tech- 
nology 
Period 1 
          
Non-
          
Mean 0,00062 0,00036 0,00068 0,00035 0,00054 0,00047 0,00129 0,00039 0,00059 0,00181 
Std. Dev. 0,01578 0,01199 0,01120 0,01176 0,01342 0,01200 0,01972 0,00983 0,01426 0,02267 
Crisis 
          
Mean -0,00069 -0,00044 -0,00129 -0,00051 -0,00083 -0,00131 -0,00156 -0,00076 -0,00104 -0,00255 
Std. Dev. 0,01853 0,01512 0,01396 0,01277 0,01525 0,01581 0,02461 0,01263 0,01882 0,03338 
Period 2 
          
Non-
          
Mean 0,00053 0,00122 0,00109 0,00082 0,00044 0,00061 0,00030 0,00102 0,00070 0,00045 
Std. Dev. 0,01002 0,01138 0,00880 0,00674 0,00691 0,00654 0,00867 0,00787 0,00800 0,01060 
Crisis 
          
Mean -0,00116 -0,00166 -0,00190 -0,00126 -0,00102 -0,00175 -0,00109 -0,00148 -0,00319 -0,00176 
Std. Dev. 0,02438 0,02906 0,02298 0,01678 0,01480 0,01836 0,01863 0,01981 0,02790 0,02292 
 
The statistics in table 2 show the same descriptive analysis for Europe. In period one, parallel 
to the U.S., the technology sector initially outperformes all sectors and declined with the 
fastest pace during the crisis. Volatility levels are slightly higher in all sectors during the crisis 
period. The financial sector has the lowest average volatility levels during both the non-crisis 
and the crisis period. This is again no sign that the hypothesis could hold for the first period. 
As a clear contrast to the U.S. market, the financial sector has neither strikingly high volatility 
levels in period two nor does it underperform as significantly during the crisis. The weakest 
performance is reported in the utility sector during the crisis and the highest volatility levels 
are found in the consumer goods sector. 
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3. Empirical models 
 
This section presents the models applied in the empirical analysis. A discussion of the 
breakpoint determination follows. The empirical approach is mainly based on Baur (2003) 
and his notation is partly retained as well. Spillover and contagion effects are obtained with a 
single estimation using Quasi Maximum Likelihood (QML). The robust standard errors 
proposed by Bollerslev and Wooldrigde (1992) are computed. The mean equation is 
fundamentally the same for all estimations with the exception of an additional dummy 
variable for the second period. Using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests the unit root 
hypothesis can be rejected convincingly for all sectors and periods, which is not surprising as 
returns are used and there is little evidence that equity prices are integrated of order two.  
The mean equation applied for the first period denotes as  
(1) 
where R2t denotes the return of the potentially infected, non-financial sector at time t and µ2 
the mean return of that sector. rF,t is the return of the financial sector at time t and DCrisis is a 
dummy variable being one in the crisis period and zero otherwise. For the second period the 
model includes an additional dummy variable and looks as follows 
(2) 
the only difference to equation (1) is the additional dummy variable sub-dividing the crisis 
period. DCrisis(1) is one for the first part of the crisis period and zero otherwise and DCrisis(2) is 
one for the second part of the crisis and zero otherwise. 
In order to model the conditional variance the error term u2t can be decomposed further 
ttt zu 222 σ=  
(3) 
where z2t is normally distributed with mean zero and variance one and t2σ  is the conditional 
volatility of R2t denoting as the following 
(4) 
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solving for 22tσ  yields 
(5) 
where c expresses a constant term, ε2,t-1 the past shocks, and 2 1, −tFr serves as a proxy for the 
shocks originating from the financial sector. Analogous to the specification of the mean 
equation an additional dummy is included for the second period and the equation looks as 
follows 
(6) 
The conditional variance is an EGARCH (1,1) model. It becomes necessary to implement the 
EGARCH specification as the estimates for d2 and/or d3 can be negative. Using a standard 
GARCH approach would then allow for a negative conditional variance which is avoided 
using EGARCH. In addition, an asymmetry parameter is included as in equity markets 
negative shocks often increase volatility more than positive shocks do (see e.g. Engle and Ng, 
1993). Baur (2003) uses the squared returns as a proxy for the variance. This has the 
advantage of avoiding any estimation error. It is straightforward to test for spillover and 
contagion effects. If b1 and/or d1 are different from zero then there are spillover effects in the 
first and/or second moment, respectively. Analogously, contagion effects can be shown if 
b2/b3 and/or d2/d3 are different from zero.  
The alternative approach for capturing volatility dynamics integrates the method used in 
Jarque (2004) into the variance specification. Instead of using the squared returns as a proxy 
the conditional variance of the financial sector is obtained estimating a separate EGARCH 
regression. The mean equation for obtaining the conditional variance of the financial sector 
denotes as the following 
tFtFFtF uRR ,1,, ++= −βµ
 
(7) 
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The variance equation is modeled as follows6 
))log(exp(
1,
1,
1,
1,2
1,
2
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(8) 
The mean equation for the contagion analysis is again represented by equation (1) for the first 
period and equation (2) for the second period. The EGARCH series obtained through (8) is 
then included in the conditional variance equation yielding two different specifications. For 
the first period 
))log(exp( 22 ,22 1,1
1,2
1,2
1,2
1,22
1,2
2
2 tCrisistFtF
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−  
(9) 
And for the second period with an additional dummy variable 
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(10) 
There is one crucial question left, namely the determination of the breakpoint. As stated 
before, the breakpoint will be determined exogenously. The notion of crisis shall be connected 
with a bear market period at the stock market. In general, the U.S. is taken as the leading 
indicator since the first signs of the crisis have evolved from the U.S. subprime mortgage 
market. For the “dot-com” bear market of 2000-2003 the breakpoint is chosen to be 
September, 24 on basis of the broad and commonly followed S&P 500 Composite Index. This 
is not exactly the peak, which is March 24, but observing the time series in chart 1 shows that 
the bear market starts only later and the period in between those two dates is characterized 
rather by a sideways trend than a bear market. The sample ends with the lowest point of the 
bear market March 11, 2003.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 For consistency the same EGARCH specification is applied. A simple GARCH model would also suffice to 
capture the dynamics. 
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Chart 1: Time Series S&P 500 Composite Index 
Time Series S&P 500 Composite Index 
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For the current financial crisis two breakpoints are chosen which sub-divide the stress period 
into two parts. The peak of the S&P 500 Composite Index is October 9, 2007. In order to 
better capture the effect of the financial sector we take the peak of the FTSE NASDAQ 
Financials sub-index (see chart 2), occurring June 17. A second breakpoint is included when 
the bear market is seemingly accelerating. The second breakpoint is chosen to be October 1, 
2008 based on ocular inspection of the long term S&P500 Composite Index time series. The 
prime interest is the combined effect of the whole crisis period and we will test both with a 
single dummy for the crisis period and two different dummies as described. Including an 
additional breakpoint also allows testing for parameter stability. The dates for the European 
markets are not exactly the same but for comparability the same breakpoints are chosen. 
Chart 2: Time Series Financials, period 2 
Time Series Financials, period 2 
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7
 It only closes higher on February 20; the period in between is more a sidewards trend and as the overall market 
was far from being in a bear market, the later breakpoint seems more appropriate. 
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4. Empirical results 
 
The results are presented and discussed separately for each period and equity market. For a 
better overview only parts of the estimates are reported. In general, the evidence for first order 
autocorrelation is not very strong and as it is not a prior interest and included as a control 
variable for the mean equation the results are not reported. The same holds for the constant in 
the mean equation µ2, which is not significant from zero for the majority of sectors. The 
estimates for the constant in the conditional variance equation c, the estimates for the absolute 
value of the past shocks α as well as the lagged conditional variance θ are not reported. They 
are generally found to be significant indicating that the EGARCH model can capture the 
volatility dynamics quite well. This is confirmed by Q-tests which do not hint at any residual 
variability in the variance. 
 
 
4.1 The “dot-com” crisis of 2000-2003 
 
Table 3 depicts the estimation results for the U.S. for the first period. The estimates for b1 
indicate positive mean spillovers for all sectors and the estimates for b2 show significant mean 
contagion originating in the financial sector for all sectors. The contagion effect is positive for 
all sectors with the exception of the health care sector and the size of the coefficient is biggest 
for the technology sector. Asymmetric effects are highly significant for the industrial and oil 
& gas sector and significant for the technology and health care sector. The coefficient γ is 
negative in those cases indicating that negative shocks result in a bigger increase of volatility 
than positive shocks do. The results for volatility spillovers and contagion are not convincing. 
Volatility spillovers are only significant in the technology sector and contagion effects are 
significant in the telecommunication and industrials sector where the sign of the effect is 
negative in the latter case. 
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Table 3: Estimation results for the U.S., period 1, squared returns as proxy for variance 
Estimation results for the U.S., period 1 
Based on equation (1) and (5), squared returns as proxy for variance 
  b1 b2 γ d1 d2  
Basic Materials 0,471* 0,358* 0,001 6,22** -9,31*  
Consumer Goods 0,525* 0,227* -0,042** 6,59** 3,47*  
Consumer Services 0,597* 0,259* -0,034** 12,63**   -7,55*  
Health Care 0,487* -0,108* -0,068** 35,56** -27,63*  
Industry 0,563* 0,355* -0,047**  7,87** -23,94*  
Oil & Gas 0,237* 0,174* -0,069** 47,93**   -9,05*  
Technology 0,632* 0,503* -0,059** 32,10** -17,27*  
Utilities 0,219* 0,181* -0,042** 72,49** 128,12*  
Telecommunication 0,460* 0,284* 0,000 49,16** 59,80*  
*   significant on a 1% level  ** significant on a 5% level 
 
Table 4 tabulates the results for the same period using the EGARCH estimation instead of the 
squared returns. The results are quite similar with additional significant estimates in the basic 
materials sector for γ and d2, indicating negative volatility contagion. 
 
Table 4: Estimation results for the U.S., period 1, EGARCH variance specification 
Estimation results for the U.S., period 1 
Based on equation (1) and (9), EGARCH variance specification 
 
b1 b2 γ d1 d2  
Basic Materials 0,479* 0,327* -0,021** 4,38** -11,57**  
Consumer Goods 0,497*  0,269* -0,029** 1315,93** 742,90**  
Consumer Services 0,597* 0,259* -0,033** 4,24** -8,88**  
Health Care 0,489* -0,108* -0,064** 3,82** -4,53**  
Industrials 0,560* 0,357* -0,047** 5,06** -25,43**  
Oil & Gas 0,239* 0,167* -0,069** 67,02** -28,30**  
Technology 0,635* 0,500* -0,064** 34,71** -27,69**  
Utilities 0,217* 0,174* -0,058** 186,12** 239,23**  
Telecommunication 0,458* 0,284* 0,002** 122,41** 94,39**  
*   significant on a 1% level  ** significant on a 5% level 
 
For the same period in Europe mean spillover effects are positive and significant as depicted 
in table 5. Mean contagion effects are positive and significant in all sectors except consumer 
goods, health care, industrials, and telecommunication. The asymmetric effects are present in 
the technology sector, utilities, telecom, and basic materials where in the latter case γ is 
positive. Significant and positive volatility spillovers are found in the basic materials, 
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consumer goods, health care, and oil & gas sector. There are no signs of any volatility 
contagion in the chosen crisis period.  
 
Table 5: Estimation results for Europe, period 1, squared returns as proxy for variance 
Estimation results for Europe, period 1 
Based on equation (1) and (5), squared returns as proxy for variance 
 b1 b2 γ d1 d2  
Basic Materials 0,632* 0,222* 0,004** 408,81** -82,50  
Consumer Goods 0,763* 0,056* -0,056** 120,82** -66,42  
Consumer Services 0,742* 0,168* -0,034** 14,73** 45,08  
Health Care 0,816* 0,037* 0,019** 416,45** -187,99  
Industrials 0,683* 0,049*  -0,050** 137,50** -3,64  
Oil & Gas 0,726* 0,286* 0,064** 677,95** -431,22  
Technology 1,106* 0,363* -0,055** 4,79** 26,70   
Utilities 0,911* 0,217* -0,072** 70,69** 20,27   
Telecommunication 1,190* 0,005*  -0,038** 40,56** -19,41  
*   significant on a 1% level  ** significant on a 5% level 
 
In table 6 the EGARCH variance for the volatility equation is used. The results in the first 
three columns are similar and the spillover effects are only found in the basic materials and 
the oil & gas sector. In line with the results shown in table 5, there are no signs of volatility 
contagion. 
 
Table 6: Estimation results for Europe, period 2, EGARCH variance specification 
Estimation results for Europe, period 2 
Based on equation (1) and (9), EGARCH variance specification 
 b1 b2 γ d1 d2  
Basic Materials 0,647* 0,176* 0,030** 714,15** -73,51  
Consumer Goods 0,765* 0,045* -0,058** 97,74** -45,98  
Consumer Services 0,744* 0,167* -0,033** -56,96** 114,03  
Health Care 0,781* 0,090* 0,026** 3506,63** -1721,05  
Industrials 0,692* 0,041* -0,051** 119,57** 540,09  
Oil & Gas 0,696* 0,341* 0,109** 2744,46** -1460,78  
Technology 1,098* 0,346* -0,058** -51,82** 89,92  
Utilities 0,904* 0,221* -0,069** 51,76** 49,43  
Telecommunication 1,188* -0,006* -0,034** -25,44** 25,98  
*   significant on a 1% level  ** significant on a 5% level 
 
In summary, the signs for mean contagion can be shown as positive and significant for all 
sectors in the U.S. and for five out of nine in Europe. The implicit assumption of exogeneity 
has to be questioned at this point, especially when looking at the time series of the financial 
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sector in that period. An alternative explanation is that the mean contagion effects are 
significant owing to the fact that other sectors decline more sharply than the financial sector in 
this crisis. Chart 3 illustrates that the financial sector is comparatively stable during the 
analyzed period. Together with the fact that there are no signs of significant volatility 
contagion we have to reject the hypothesis that the financial sector plays a central role in this 
crisis period. This result is not surprising as there was a lack of theoretical reasoning 
beforehand and the analysis should merely serve to complement and support the analysis of 
the financial crisis of 2007-2009 investigated later on. 
 
Chart 3: Time Series Financials, period 1 
Time Series Financials, period 1 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
Ja
n
-
98
M
ay
-
98
Se
p-
98
Ja
n
-
99
M
ay
-
99
Se
p-
99
Ja
n
-
00
M
ay
-
00
Se
p-
00
Ja
n
-
01
M
ay
-
01
Se
p-
01
Ja
n
-
02
M
ay
-
02
Se
p-
02
Ja
n
-
03
FTSE NASDAQ Financials (U.S.)
DJ STOXX Financials (Europe)
 
 
4.2 The financial crisis of 2007-2009 
 
The presentation of the results for the second period is more complex and to make the main 
aspects evident not all information is included in the tables. Estimations are performed with 
two separate dummies sub-dividing the crisis period and a joint dummy for the whole period. 
This raises the question whether the two estimates for the dummy coefficients are 
significantly different from each other. This can be tested with a simple WALD test and shall 
be indicated by a “#”, if significant, following the first of the two estimates. In most cases 
there are no signs of parameter instability and the estimation with a joint crisis dummy is 
easier to grasp and will be referred to if not mentioned otherwise. A “~” indicates that the 
estimate stems from the specification with only one dummy for the joint crisis period. Next to 
the omissions made for the first crisis period the coefficient b ̃1 is left out as the size is found 
to be very close to b1.  
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Table 7 shows that mean spillovers are positive and significant for all sectors and mean 
contagion is significant for all sectors except for the later crisis period in the oil & gas sector. 
In contrast to the bear market starting in 2000 the contagion effect is negative, indicating that 
the shocks of the financial sector have less impact on the mean of other sectors during the 
stress period. This supports the notion that the decline in the financial sector was rather an 
isolated development and driven by an idiosyncratic shock. WALD tests do not hint at any 
differences of the parameters during the stress period except for the consumer service sector 
where the negative contagion effects are even bigger in the second phase of the crisis than in 
the first period. The asymmetry parameter γ is significant for four out of the nine sectors. In 
general, the volatility spillover effects are mostly negative in the non-crisis period and 
positive for the crisis period. They are, however, only significant from zero for the utilities, 
technology, and oil & gas sector. There are no signs of parameter instability for the volatility 
contagion effects and volatility contagion is significant for five out of the nine sectors for the 
joint crisis period. The evidence for the argument of decreased consumer confidence as the 
mechanism for contagion is mixed. The consumer goods sector volatility is not significantly 
affected by the financial sector, while the consumer service sector is significantly influenced. 
The highly significant volatility contagion effects in the utility sector could probably be better 
explained by a supply side effect of increasing difficulties to secure financing.  
 
Table 7: Estimation results for the U.S., period 2, squared returns as proxy for variance 
Estimation results for the U.S., period 2 
Based on equation (1),(5) and (2),(6), squared returns as proxy for variance 
 b1 b2 b3 b2̃ γ  
Basic Materials 0,987* -0,458** -0,387* -0,426** -0,010**  
Consumer Goods 0,658* -0,341** -0,373* -0,351** -0,051**  
Consumer Services 0,802* -0,291*# -0,414* -0,320** -0,055**  
Health Care 0,620* -0,316** -0,303* -0,312** -0,003**  
Industrials 0,784* -0,296** -0,289* -0,295** -0,051**  
Oil & Gas 0,645* -0,271** -0,154* -0,205** -0,060**  
Technology 0,885* -0,429** -0,418* -0,419** -0,048**  
Utilities 0,622* -0,343** -0,341* -0,344** -0,026**  
Telecommunication 0,699* -0,232** -0,304* -0,254** -0,006**  
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 d1 d2 d3 d1̃ d2̃  
Basic Materials -99,70** 119,97** 100,01** -246,15** 251,60**  
Consumer Goods 14,40** 15,22** -6,29** -50,12** 64,31**  
Consumer Services -161,64** 199,07** 174,40** -320,88** 341,69**  
Health Care -452,45** 496,77** 485,53** -514,78** 553,02**  
Industrials -311,28** 340,07** 328,05** -391,50** 412,09**  
Oil & Gas -142,95** 181,01** 158,96** -243,84** 265,01**  
Technology -295,18** 319,90** 302,20** -414,48** 425,89**  
Utilities -657,42** 701,12** 687,85** -724,33** 758,55**  
Telecommunication -278,64** 307,54** 286,94** -342,87** 353,62**  
*   significant on a 1% level  ** significant on a 5% level 
 
The EGARCH variance specification yields less significant results for the variance spillover 
and contagion effects and confirms the results for the mean and asymmetry parameters. 
 
Table 8: Estimation results for the U.S., period 2, EGARCH variance specification 
Estimation results for the U.S., period 2 
Based on equation (1),(9) and (2),(10), EGARCH variance specification 
 b1 b2 b3 b2̃ γ  
Basic Materials 0,984* -0,456** -0,425** -0,423** -0,006**  
Consumer Goods 0,662* -0,342** -0,378** -0,351** -0,052**  
Consumer Services 0,812* -0,282*# -0,419** -0,320** -0,083**  
Health Care 0,620* -0,316** -0,303** -0,314** -0,028**  
Industrials 0,798* -0,303** -0,304** -0,305** -0,074**  
Oil & Gas 0,640* -0,263** -0,144** -0,208** -0,086**  
Technology 0,897* -0,425** -0,421** -0,423** -0,067**  
Utilities 0,625* -0,318** -0,341** -0,339** -0,063**  
Telecommunication 0,702* -0,225** -0,305** -0,252** -0,001**  
 d1 d2 d3 d1̃ d2̃  
Basic Materials -345,12** 692,90** 445,07** -157,71** 157,41**  
Consumer Goods 203,46** -139,70** -186,66** 39,20** -22,88**  
Consumer Services -55,12** 436,66** 218,69** -962,02** 110,69**  
Health Care -452,45** 496,77** 485,53** -140,09** 165,79**  
Industrials -257,52** 476,20** 349,88** -451,60** 496,82**  
Oil & Gas 103,50** 19,35** *-51,57** -181,74** 218,37**  
Technology -348,24** 762,62** 498,38** -544,40** 581,91**  
Utilities -653,95** 894,13** 767,12** -881,87** 965,24**  
Telecommunication -399,97** 513,12** 439,67** -543,38** 567,53**  
*  significant on a 1% level  ** significant on a 5% level 
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The results for Europe, displayed in table 9, are different particularly the ones for the mean 
contagion effects. Mean spillover effects are positive and significant as well, while contagion 
effects are less significant than for the U.S. and positive in sign contrasting the results for the 
U.S. equity sub-indices. Similar to the U.S., mean contagion tends to be more significant in 
the first part of the crisis. Volatility spillover effects during the non-crisis period are either 
negative or insignificant. Volatility contagion effects for the joint crisis period can be shown 
for six out of the nine sectors. Volatility contagion effects are significant for the first stage of 
the crisis for all sectors expect utilities and consumer services. The results for the second part 
of the crisis period are only significant for three sectors although WALD tests could not show 
parameter instability in any of the sectors and the size of the estimates appears close to the 
estimates of the first period. The insignificance may be caused by the comparatively short 
time span of the second part of the crisis. 
 
Table 9: Estimation results for Europe, period 2, squared returns as proxy for variance 
Estimation results for Europe, period 2 
Based on equation (1),(5) and (2),(6), squared returns as proxy for variance 
 b1 b2 b3 b2̃ γ  
Basic Materials 0.807* 0.263** 0.294** 0.280* -0.047**  
Consumer Goods 0.592* 0.120** 0.012** 0.070* -0.052**  
Consumer Services 0.549* 0.291*# 0.102** 0.174* -0.041**  
Health Care 0.414* 0.065** 0.133** 0.088* 0.017**  
Industrials 0.685* 0.315** 0.162** 0.248* -0.093**  
Oil & Gas 0.687* 0.227** 0.343** 0.273* -0.002**  
Technology 0.742* 0.208** 0.012** 0.099* -0.042**  
Utilities 0.678* 0.281** 0.235** 0.264* -0.059**  
Telecommunication 0.598* 0.211** 0.111** 0.157* -0.010**  
 d1 d2 d3 d1̃ d2̃  
Basic Materials -414,24* 437,05** 426,65** -421,34** 433,61**  
Consumer Goods -342,28* 414,46** 408,18** -353,09** 424,38**  
Consumer Services -200,09* 177,74** 191,61** -208,72** 202,95**  
Health Care -178,80* 232,87** 206,63** -250,08** 282,01**  
Industrials -251,99* 302,54** 266,32** -289,43** 302,83**  
Oil & Gas -210,74* 254,41** 225,26** -267,38** 284,85**  
Technology -234,00* 259,14** 236,22** -271,93** 272,87**  
Utilities -161,09* 225,89** 154,02** -210,10** 201,93**  
Telecommunication -87,79* 82,49** 83,30** -85,63** 82,89**  
*   significant on a 1% level  ** significant on a 5% level 
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The results using the EGARCH series are similar and confirm the results using the squared 
returns as a proxy. 
 
Table 10:Estimation results for Europe, period 2, EGARCH variance specification 
Estimation results for Europe, period 2 
Based on equation (1),(9) and (2),(10), EGARCH variance specification 
 b1 b2 b3 b ̃2 γ  
Basic Materials 0,814* 0,253** 0,276** 0,264* -0,044**  
Consumer Goods 0,595* 0,110** 0,010** 0,055* -0,059**  
Consumer Services 0,552* 0,292*# 0,099** 0,173* -0,040**  
Health Care 0,430* 0,046** 0,117** 0,078* 0,026**  
Industrials 0,688* 0,311** 0,154** 0,243* -0,095**  
Oil & Gas 0,688* 0,227** 0,338** 0,272* -0,003**  
Technology 0,745* 0,203** 0,007** 0,094* -0,042**  
Utilities 0,681* 0,279** 0,233** 0,263* -0,058**  
Telecommunication 0,609* 0,210** 0,100** 0,145* -0,012**  
 d1 d2 d3 d ̃1 d ̃2  
Basic Materials -289,20** 293,32** 307,99** -272,89** 292,96**  
Consumer Goods -344,39** 538,29** 506,97** -372,89** 541,79**  
Consumer Services -232,45** 188,06** 213,82** -231,21** 220,80**  
Health Care -323,32** 378,62** 405,14** -288,43** 368,44**  
Industrials -273,18** 290,86** 293,52** -284,68** 307,09**  
Oil & Gas -214,25** 239,67** 240,23** -216,69** 245,59**  
Technology -199,21** 238,92** 208,86** -249,73** 256,49**  
Utilities -160,40** 204,60** 151,08** -199,86** 184,89**  
Telecommunication -86,91** 71,32** 77,25** -89,19** 79,94**  
*   significant on a 1% level  ** significant on a 5% level 
 
Summarizing the results for the second period, a different impact of the financial sector 
comparing the U.S. and Europe is revealed. Mean contagion effects are negative in the U.S. 
and positive in Europe. Volatility contagion effects are significant for a majority of sectors in 
both the U.S. and Europe. Non-financial sectors that are consistently affected by significantly 
positive volatility contagion across all markets and specifications are technology, industrials, 
and health care. Further conclusions are drawn in the following section. 
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Conclusions 
 
The empirical results suggest that the financial sector plays a different, slightly more central 
role in the financial crisis of 2007-2009 comparing it to the “dot-com” induced downturn of 
2000-2003. Mean contagion effects are mostly positive in Europe for both periods and in the 
U.S. for the first period, whereas in the U.S. they are negative during the credit crunch 
affected crisis. This provides evidence that the decline in the financial sector in the U.S. is 
sharper than in all other sectors and, taking the corresponding significant mean contagion 
effects into consideration, an isolated development. On the back of the analysis of the first 
moment the initial hypothesis of the financial sector as the originator of the market downturn 
of 2007-2009 has to be clearly rejected for the U.S. market. Although contagion effects are 
positive for Europe during the financial crisis this is no strong evidence for our hypothesis as 
contagion is equally positive in the 2000-period.  
Volatility contagion effects can be shown for a majority of sectors during the financial crisis 
of 2007-2009 in both the U.S. and Europe, standing in clear contrast to the findings of the 
downturn of 2000-2003 where they are insignificant for most sectors. This allows the 
conclusion that the instability of the financial sector partly encroaches on other economic 
sectors what leads to an increase of insecurity expressed in terms of higher volatility in most 
non-financial sectors. Hence, in the second moment evidence is provided that the initial 
hypothesis can be accepted for most non-financial sectors. 
Analyzing the second topic of interest, namely whether economic sectors are affected 
differently by the crisis, reveals that volatility contagion is consistently positive and 
significant for the technology, industrials, and health care sector. As those sectors have 
limited direct exposure to consumer confidence fluctuations the results tend to confirm the 
findings of Tong and Wei (2008) who show a stronger effect of supply-side effects resulting 
from the credit crunch. However, our analysis is not suitable to clearly distinguish between 
those two effects as the sectors do not seem to be homogenous when it comes to the degree of 
leverage and sensitivity to consumer demand. 
Other findings worth mentioning are that there is little evidence that the estimates for the 
contagion effects change during the crisis period of 2007-2009 and evidence of asymmetric 
effects of shocks can be found for less than half of the analyzed sectors.  
In terms of policy implications the essay adds to the stream of arguments that appropriate 
regulation and supervision of the financial sector is necessary as it finds positive volatility 
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contagion caused by the financial sector. It could not provide clear indications on how to 
guide economic policy on a sectoral level. 
Future research could extend the sectoral analysis by paying more attention to the actual 
sensitiveness towards supply-side and demand-side effects of the financial crisis. By 
including such variables closer insight for distinct policy reactions could be gained, that is to 
say which sectors need additional government support to mitigate the effects of a credit crisis. 
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Appendix: 
 
Appendix 1: Summary statistics for the U.S., complete period returns 
Summary statistics for the U.S., complete period returns 
  
 Basic 
Materials 
 Consumer 
Goods 
Consumer 
Services  
Health 
Care  
 Indus- 
trials 
Oil & 
Gas  
 Tele- 
com. 
Finan- 
cials  
 Utili- 
ties 
 Tech- 
nology 
Period 1:           
 Mean -6,66E-05 -7,4E-05 -0,0004 -0,0002 -9,1E-05 -0,0003 -4,0E-05 -0,0003 -0,0001 -0,0002 
 Median 0,0000 0,0002 -1,8E-05 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,00011 0,0000 7,56E-05 
 Maximum 0,066901 0,05488 0,06318 0,04813 0,06979 0,05917 0,07453 0,10762 0,07629 0,0781 
 Minimum -0,05924 -0,0604 -0,075 -0,0594 -0,0632 -0,0613 -0,0745 -0,1222 -0,0816 -0,098 
 Std. Dev. 0,013581 0,01223 0,01397 0,01125 0,01432 0,01262 0,01717 0,02838 0,02225 0,01659 
 Skewness 0,009657 -0,2471 -0,1086 -0,167 0,00939 -0,1437 -0,0862 -0,0105 0,10863 -0,1272 
 Kurtosis 5,3275 5,5949 5,1952 5,1721 5,0800 4,9338 4,5167 4,1088 3,4868 6,3375 
 Jarque-Bera 307,45 395,99 276,15 274,07 245,53 216,90 132,24 69,80 16,13 635,80 
 Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0003 0,0000 
 Sum -0,09068 -0,1013 -0,5426 -0,2153 -0,1235 -0,4198 -0,0551 -0,4711 -0,2031 -0,2753 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0,251043 0,20369 0,26555 0,17227 0,27926 0,21679 0,40117 1,09638 0,67402 0,37436 
 Observations 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 
Period 2:           
 Mean -6,62E-06 -6,4E-05 -3,9E-04 -4,3E-05 -1,8E-04 -0,0002 -0,0002 -0,0005 -0,0003 -0,001 
 Median 0,000917 0,00033 0,00011 0,0002 0,0000 0,00086 0,0000 0,0000 2,5E-05 0,0E+00 
 Maximum 0,132894 0,12594 0,08346 0,14858 0,08604 0,09978 0,1186 0,08515 0,09664 0,14667 
 Minimum -0,12424 -0,0607 -0,0684 -0,0868 -0,0682 -0,0961 -0,1004 -0,0997 -0,0943 -0,1018 
 Std. Dev. 0,020862 0,01212 0,01301 0,01428 0,011 0,01646 0,01763 0,017 0,01383 0,01927 
 Skewness -0,2337 0,89813 -0,0931 0,39313 0,218 -0,1305 0,04082 -0,1477 0,00318 0,2496 
 Kurtosis 11,3581 18,3555 8,8804 21,8575 13,5126 10,5471 12,3269 8,0288 10,9821 12,9228 
 Jarque-Bera 3.191,4 10.885,2 1.576,4 16.223,1 5.041,7 2.597,1 3.962,0 1.155,7 2.901,6 4.495,5 
 Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
 Sum -0,00723 0,0000 -0,4291 -0,0475 -0,1995 -0,1978 -0,2038 -0,5377 -0,3163 -1,04529 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0,475279 0,16037 0,18477 0,22254 0,13211 0,29595 0,33948 0,31543 0,20882 0,40531 
 Observations 1093 1093 1093 1093 1093 1093 1093 1093 1093 1093 
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics for Europe, complete period returns 
Summary statistics for Europe, complete period returns 
  
 Basic 
Materials 
 Consumer 
Goods 
Consumer 
Services  
Health 
Care  
 Indus- 
trials 
Oil & 
Gas  
 Tele- 
com. 
Finan- 
cials  
 Utili- 
ties 
 Tech- 
nology 
Period 1:           
 Mean -6,66E-05 -7,4E-05 -0,0004 -0,0002 -9,1E-05 -0,0003 -4,0E-05 -0,0003 -0,0001 -0,0002 
 Median 0,0000 0,0002 -1,8E-05 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,00011 0,0000 7,56E-05 
 Maximum 0,066901 0,05488 0,06318 0,04813 0,06979 0,05917 0,07453 0,10762 0,07629 0,0781 
 Minimum -0,05924 -0,0604 -0,075 -0,0594 -0,0632 -0,0613 -0,0745 -0,1222 -0,0816 -0,098 
 Std. Dev. 0,013581 0,01223 0,01397 0,01125 0,01432 0,01262 0,01717 0,02838 0,02225 0,01659 
 Skewness 0,009657 -0,2471 -0,1086 -0,167 0,00939 -0,1437 -0,0862 -0,0105 0,10863 -0,1272 
 Kurtosis 5,3275 5,5949 5,1952 5,1721 5,0800 4,9338 4,5167 4,1088 3,4868 6,3375 
 Jarque-Bera 307,45 395,99 276,15 274,07 245,53 216,90 132,24 69,80 16,13 635,80 
 Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0003 0,0000 
 Sum -0,09068 -0,1013 -0,5426 -0,2153 -0,1235 -0,4198 -0,0551 -0,4711 -0,2031 -0,2753 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0,251043 0,20369 0,26555 0,17227 0,27926 0,21679 0,40117 1,09638 0,67402 0,37436 
 Observations 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 
Period 2:           
 Mean -6,62E-06 -6,4E-05 -3,9E-04 -4,3E-05 -1,8E-04 -0,0002 -0,0002 -0,0005 -0,0003 -0,001 
 Median 0,000917 0,00033 0,00011 0,0002 0,0000 0,00086 0,0000 0,0000 2,5E-05 0,0000 
 Maximum 0,132894 0,12594 0,08346 0,14858 0,08604 0,09978 0,1186 0,08515 0,09664 0,14667 
 Minimum -0,12424 -0,0607 -0,0684 -0,0868 -0,0682 -0,0961 -0,1004 -0,0997 -0,0943 -0,1018 
 Std. Dev. 0,020862 0,01212 0,01301 0,01428 0,011 0,01646 0,01763 0,017 0,01383 0,01927 
 Skewness -0,2337 0,89813 -0,0931 0,39313 0,218 -0,1305 0,04082 -0,1477 0,00318 0,2496 
 Kurtosis 11,3581 18,3555 8,8804 21,8575 13,5126 10,5471 12,3269 8,0288 10,9821 12,9228 
 Jarque-Bera 3.191,4 10.885,2 1.576,4 16.223,1 5.041,7 2.597,1 3.962,0 1.155,7 2.901,6 4.495,5 
 Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
 Sum -0,00723 0,0000 -0,4291 -0,0475 -0,1995 -0,1978 -0,2038 -0,5377 -0,3163 -1,04529 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0,475279 0,16037 0,18477 0,22254 0,13211 0,29595 0,33948 0,31543 0,20882 0,40531 
 Observations 1093 1093 1093 1093 1093 1093 1093 1093 1093 1093 
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Appendix 3: Correlations with the financial sector 
Correlations with the financial sector 
 
 Basic 
Materials 
 Consumer 
Goods 
Consumer 
Services  
Health 
Care  
 Indus- 
trials 
Oil & 
Gas  
 Tele- 
com. 
 Utili- 
ties 
 Tech- 
nology  
U.S.           
Period 1           
Non-crisis 0,538 0,643 0,725 0,602 0,701 0,272 0,542 0,362 0,475  
Crisis 0,702 0,715 0,785 0,560 0,819 0,434 0,642 0,459 0,643  
Period 2:           
Non-crisis 0,679 0,717 0,821 0,719 0,794 0,337 0,650 0,581 0,722  
Crisis 0,694 0,773 0,843 0,744 0,852 0,628 0,746 0,622 0,793  
Europe           
Period 1           
Non-crisis 0,528 0,694 0,701 0,577 0,679 0,418 0,665 0,697 0,601  
Crisis 0,710 0,824 0,741 0,745 0,666 0,669 0,605 0,792 0,542  
Period 2:           
Non-crisis 0,629 0,731 0,681 0,447 0,713 0,529 0,533 0,729 0,571  
Crisis 0,745 0,644 0,733 0,686 0,754 0,832 0,782 0,682 0,702  
 
